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Abstract—We propose and analyze adaptive network 
management for countering selective capture which aims to 
compromise critical sensor nodes close to the base station in a 
wireless sensor network (WSN) to block data delivery. We 
consider 3 countermeasures in the protocol design: (1) dynamic 
radio range adjustment; (2) multisource multipath routing for 
intrusion tolerance; and (3) voting-based intrusion detection. We 
identify the best protocol settings in terms of the best redundancy 
level used for multisource multipath routing, and the best 
number of voters and the intrusion invocation interval used for 
intrusion detection under which the lifetime of a WSN is 
maximized in the presence of selective capture which turns nodes 
into malicious nodes capable of performing packet dropping 
attacks and bad-mouthing attacks.  
Keywords — Wireless sensor networks, selective capture, 
multipath routing, intrusion detection, lifetime maximization. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Many wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are deployed in an 
unattended environment in which energy replenishment is 
difficult if not impossible. Due to limited resources, a WSN 
must minimize energy consumption to prolong the system 
useful lifetime, while satisfying the application specific QoS 
requirements such as reliability, timeliness and security. This is 
especially a critical issue in military or mission-critical WSN 
applications.  
It is well known that sensor nodes (SNs) close to the base 
station (BS) are more critical in gathering and routing sensing 
data. In the literature, various schemes [1, 3, 12] have been 
designed for preserving critical SNs from energy exhaustion so 
as to prolong the system lifetime; however, how to counter 
selective capture, i.e., critical SNs are targets of select capture 
attacks, is still an open issue [16].  
In this paper, we propose and analyze an adaptive network 
management algorithm with 3 countermeasures to counter 
selective capture: (1) dynamic radio range adjustment; (2) 
multisource multipath routing for intrusion tolerance; and (3) 
voting-based intrusion detection. We develop a probability 
model to reveal the tradeoff between energy consumption vs. 
reliability and security gain with the goal to maximize the 
lifetime of a query-based WSN. More specifically, we analyze 
the optimal amount of redundancy for multipath routing and 
the best intrusion detection settings for detection strength under 
which the lifetime of a query-based WSN is maximized in the 
presence of selective capture.  
II.  SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider a query-based WSN with low-power SNs 
distributed in a geographic area. There is a base station 
assigned to the WSN that interconnects the WSN to the outside 
world and that fields queries from the outside world for sensing 
results. The initial energy of each SN is   
  . The deployment 
area of the WSN is assumed circular with radius    . 
All SNs are subject to capture attacks. With  selective 
capture, the adversaries (humans or robots) strategically 
capture SNs and turn them into inside attackers. We represent 
the capture rate of a SN at a distance x away from the BS at 
time t by   
    ,  . A possible form is a linear function, i.e., the 
capture rate drops linearly as the SN is further away from the 
base station:   
  
    ,       
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where   
    is the maximum capture rate the adversary can 
possibly have; and   
    is the minimum capture rate. With 
random capture, the adversary randomly performs capture 
attacks, i.e.,   
             
        
    /2.   After a node is 
compromised it becomes an inside attacker performing packet 
dropping [7], and bad-mouthing attacks to disrupt the operation 
of the network. A compromised node performs bad-mouthing 
attacks by recommending a good node as a bad node, and a bad 
node as a good node when participating in the voting-based 
distributed IDS as a voter (described below). As a result, bad-
mouthing attacks can cause good nodes being misdiagnosed 
and evicted from the system, and bad nodes being missed and 
stayed in the system. This effectively creates an area with a 
high concentration of bad nodes, especially for critical SN 
areas with a high capture rate under selective capture. 
We consider random deployment where SNs are deployed 
randomly and distributed according to homogeneous spatial 
Poisson processes with density   
  . The initial total number of 
SNs in the system thus is   
        
         .   Our  first 
countermeasure against selective capture is dynamic radio 
range adjustment. With random deployment, the initial radio 
range is denoted by    
   such that the average number of 
neighbor SNs is   ,  which is a system parameter for 
maintaining connectivity. A SN adjusts its radio range 
dynamically throughout its lifetime to maintain connectivity 
such that the average number of 1-hop neighbor SNs remains at 
  .Thus, SNs closer to the BS may have to increase radio range 
more than SNs away from the BS to counter selective capture. 
Any communication between two nodes with a distance greater than single hop radio range between them would require a 
multi-hop. 
Our second countermeasure against selective capture is 
multipath routing for intrusion tolerance. This is achieved 
through two forms of redundancy: (a) source redundancy by 
which  ms SNs sensing a physical phenomenon in the same 
feature zone are used to forward sensing data to the BS; (b) 
path redundancy by which mp paths are used to relay packets 
from a source SN to the BS. We assume geographic forwarding 
is being used to packet routing; thus, no path information is 
maintained.  
While data delivery could fail due to hardware failure and 
transmission failure because of noise and interference, we only 
consider failure caused by compromised nodes performing 
packet drop attacks and data modification attacks. We assume 
that SNs operate in power saving mode (e.g. [3, 12]). Thus, a 
SN is either active (transmitting or receiving) or in sleep mode. 
For the transmission and reception energy consumption of 
sensors, we adopt the energy model in [15] for SNs. We 
assume that the BS will have pairwise keys with the SNs. A SN 
also has a pairwise key with each of its neighbors, up to a few 
hops away for future expandability. Thus, a SN can encrypt 
data for confidentiality and authentication purposes.  
Our last countermeasure against selective capture is voting-
based intrusion detection system (IDS) mechanisms to detect 
and evict compromised nodes. Every SN runs a simple host 
IDS to assess its neighbors. The host IDS is light-weight to 
conserve energy. It is also generic and does not rely on the 
feedback mechanism tied in with a specific routing protocol 
(e.g., MDMP for WSNS [8] or AODV for MANETs [14]). It is 
based on local monitoring. That is, each node monitors its 
neighbor nodes only. Each node uses a set of anomaly 
detection rules such as a high discrepancy in the sensor reading 
or recommendation has been experienced, a packet is not 
forwarded as requested, as well as interval, retransmission, 
repetition, and delay rules as in [2, 4, 13]. If the count exceeds 
a system-defined threshold, a neighbor node that is being 
monitored is considered compromised. The imperfection of 
monitoring due to environment noise or channel error is 
modeled by a “host” false positive probability (       and  a 
“host” false negative probability (      which  are  assumed 
known at deployment time. 
A voting-based distributed IDS is applied periodically in 
every      time interval. A SN is being assessed by its neighbor 
SNs. In each interval, m neighbor SNs around a target SN will 
be chosen randomly as voters and cast their votes based on 
their host IDS results to collectively decide if the target SN is 
still a good node. The m voters share their votes through secure 
transmission using their pairwise keys. When the majority of 
voters come to the conclusion that a target node is bad, then the 
target node is evicted. There is a system-level false positive 
probability     that the voters can incorrectly identify a good 
node as a bad node. There is also a system-level false negative 
probability     that the voters can incorrectly misidentify a bad 
node as a good node. In the paper, we will derive the two 
system-level IDS probabilities based on bad-mouthing attacks 
performed by inside attackers.  
To provide a unifying metric that considers the above two 
design tradeoffs, we define the total number of queries the 
system can answer correctly until it fails as the lifetime or the 
mean time to failure (the MTTF) of the system, which can be 
translated into the actual system lifetime span given the query 
arrival rate. A failure occurs when no response toward a query 
is received. The cause could be due to energy exhaustion, or 
packet dropping by malicious nodes. Our aim is to find both 
the optimal redundancy levels and IDS settings under which 
the MTTF is maximized, when given a set of parameters 
characterizing the operational and environment conditions. 
III.  PROBABILITY MODEL 
In this section we develop a probability model to estimate 
the MTTF of a query-based WSN built with the three 
countermeasure mechanisms in the protocol design. A 
parameter can be an input, derived, design or output parameter. 
Specifically, mp (path redundancy), ms (source redundancy), m 
(the number of voters for intrusion detection) and      (the 
intrusion detection interval) are design parameters whose 
values are to be identified to maximize the system MTTF, 
when given a set of input parameter values charactering the 
operational and environmental conditions. Derived parameters 
are those deriving from input parameters. There is only one 
output parameter, namely, the MTTF. Note that most derived 
parameters are dynamic, i.e., as a function of time. For 
example, SN density, denoted by      ,  , decreases over time 
because of node failure/eviction as time progresses. On the 
other hand, radio range, denoted by      ,  , increases over 
time to maintain connectivity.  
The basic idea of our MTTF formulation is that we first 
deduce the maximum number of queries,   , the system can 
possible handle before running into energy exhaustion for the 
best case in which all queries are processed successfully. 
Because the system evolves dynamically, the amount of energy 
spent per query also varies dynamically. Given the query 
arrival rate     as input, the average interval between query 
arrivals is 1/  . So we can reasonably estimate the amount of 
energy spent due to query processing and intrusion detection 
for query j based on the query arrival time    , . We then derive 
the corresponding query success probability      ,  , that is, 
the probability that the response to query j arriving at time 
  ,  is delivered successfully to the BS. Finally, we compute 
the MTTF as the probability-weighted average of the number 
of queries the system can handle without experiencing any 
failure. More specifically, the MTTF is computed by: 
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Here   ∏      ,    
      1       ,       accounts for the 
probability of the system being able to successfully execute i 
consecutive queries but failing the i+1
th  query. The second 
term is for the best case in which all queries are processed 
successfully without experiencing any failure for which the 
system will have the longest lifetime span. 
A.  Network Dynamics 
Let      ,   represent the density of SNs at distance x 
from the BS at time t. Initially at deployment time all SNs are 
good nodes, so      ,0      
   for all x’s.  
As time progresses some SNs are captured and turned into 
compromised nodes and some SNs fail. Moreover some SNs may be diagnosed as bad nodes and get evicted from the 
system. Let T be the capture time of a SN following a 
distribution function Fc(t). Then, the probability that a SN at 
location x away from the BS is compromised at time t, given 
that it was a good node at time t-    , denoted by    
    ,  , is 
given by:  
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In the special case in which the capture time is exponential 
distributed,     
    ,    1      
    ,        for a SN at 
distance x from its BS. Recall that the voting-based distributed 
IDS executes periodically with      being the interval. At the 
i
th IDS execution time (denoted by   , ), a good SN at distance x 
from its BS may have been compromised with 
probability    
    ,  ,    since the previous IDS execution 
time    ,    . Let      
     ,   and     
     ,   denote  the densities 
of good, and bad SNs at distance x f r o m  t h e  B S  a t  t i m e  t, 
respectively.  Then, the densities of good and bad SNs at time 
  ,  just prior to IDS execution can be recursively estimated 
from the densities of good and bad SNs at time   ,    by: 
     
     ,  ,         
     ,  ,    
     
    ,  ,       
     ,  ,     
(4)
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     ,  ,    
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     ,  ,      
The boundary conditions are       
     ,0      
    and      
     ,0   
0 for all x’s.  
Every SN dynamically adjusts its radio range for 
maintaining connectivity with its peers such that on average the 
number of 1-hop neighbor nodes is    to support its intended 
functions including routing and participating in majority voting 
IDS as a verifier. In particular, critical SNs must increase radio 
range more due to more node eviction as a result of more 
intensive capture and bad-mouthing attacks toward critical 
SNs. 
Let      ,   denote the radio range of a SN at distance x 
from its BS at time t so it can find    SNs within radio range. 
Since the SN density is a function of the distance (x) away from 
the BS, we have to solve      ,   by integration of the SN 
population from x-     ,   to  x+     ,  .  Let X and Y be 
two variables denoting the X and Y coordinates in the X-Y 
coordinate system. Since           ,         and      
     ,  
    
gives the area of the upper semicircle, the expected number of 
SNs covered by radio range, denoted by      ,  ,  can be 
obtained by solving the following equation: 
2           ,           ,          
     ,  
      ,  
        (5)
where the integral gives the expected number of SNs 
(accounting for density variation along X) located in the upper 
or lower half circle.  
Next we estimate the system-level false positive probability 
       and false negative probability        at time t as a resulting 
of executing voting-based IDS. For notational convenience, let 
     ,   be the number of neighbor SNs of a SN located at 
distance x f r om  th e BS  a t  ti m e t, ň    ,   be the number of 
forwarding neighbors (with f=1/4 for geographical routing), 
     
     ,   be the number of good neighbors, and     
     ,   be 
the number of bad neighbors at time t.  Since we know the 
densities of good and bad nodes at time   ,  just prior to IDS 
execution, we have: 
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The above information allows us to derive the system-level 
false positive probability        and false negative probability 
       at time t, as follows (note: we omit distance x and time t 
in the mathematical expression below for brevity): 
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where      is the minimum majority of m, e.g., 3 is the 
minimum majority of 5, and ⍵ is       for calculating      and 
     for calculating     .  We explain Equation 7 for the false 
positive probability at time t below. The explanation to the 
false negative probability is similar. A false positive results 
when the majority of the voters vote against the target node 
(which is a good node) as compromised. The first term in 
Equation 7 accounts for the case in which more than 1/2 of the 
voters selected from the target node’s neighbors are bad 
sensors who, as a result of performing bad-mouthing attacks, 
will always vote a good node as a bad node. Since more than 
1/2 of the m voters vote no, the target node (which is a good 
node) is diagnosed as a bad node in this case, resulting in a 
false positive. Here the denominator is the total number of 
combinations to select m voters out of all neighbor nodes, and 
the numerator is the total number of combinations to select at 
least mmaj bad voters out of nbad nodes and the remaining good 
voters out of ngood nodes. The second term accounts for the case 
in which more than 1/2 of the voters selected from the 
neighbors are good nodes but unfortunately some of these good 
nodes mistakenly misidentify the target nodes as a bad node 
with host false positive probability     , resulting in more than 
1/2 of the voters (although some of those are good nodes) 
voting no against the target node. Since more than 1/2 of the m 
voters vote no, the target node (which is a good node) is also 
diagnosed as a bad node in this case, again resulting in a false 
positive. Here the denominator is again the total number of 
combinations to select m voters out of  all neighbor nodes, and 
the numerator is the total number of combinations to select i 
bad voters not exceeding the majority mmaj, j good voters who 
diagnose incorrectly with i + j  ≥ mmaj, and the remaining m – i – j good voters who diagnose correctly. Here we note that more 
voters do not necessarily provide better detection accuracy 
since it depends on the percentage of bad node population. That 
is, if more bad nodes exist than good nodes in the 
neighborhood, or good nodes have high host false positive 
probability (     ) and host false negative probability (     ), 
then more voters will provide less detection accuracy. 
After the voting-based IDS is executed, a good node may 
be misidentified as a bad node with probability      and will be 
mistakenly removed from the WSN. Consequently, we need to 
adjust the population of good nodes after IDS execution. Let 
      
     ,  ,                    and      
     ,  ,                   denote the densities of good and bad 
SN nodes located at distance x from the BS, respectively, after 
IDS execution at time t. Then:  
     
     ,  ,                           
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Therefore for a SN at distance x from its BS, the 
probability it is a bad SN at time   , , denoted by 
  , 
     ,  ,   where j denotes the node id of the SN, is given by: 
  , 
     ,  ,   
    
     ,  ,                  
    
     ,  ,                          
     ,  ,                     (9)
  ,  derived above provides critical information because a 
bad node can perform packet dropping attacks causing a path 
to be broken if it is on a path from source SNs to the BS. 
Here we note that the good/bad node density will remain 
the same until the next IDS execution (after      seconds) 
because the IDS only detects and evicts nodes periodically 
(given that typically node hardware/software failure happens 
less frequently than security failure). The remaining nodes are 
good nodes that pass the IDS evaluation and bad nodes that 
are undetected by the IDS. Thus,      
     ,  ,                         and      
     ,  ,                        
obtained at time   ,    essentially become      
     ,  ,   1   and 
    
     ,  ,    , respectively, for the next round of IDS execution 
at time   , . 
We can also estimate the number of SNs in the WSN at 
time t as:   
                ,    2     
   
 
  (10)
B.  Query Success Probability 
We will use the notation SNj to refer to SN j responsible to 
relay the packet for the jth hop from the source SN to the BS. 
Also we will use the notation      to refer to the distance from 
SNj to its BS.  
Let DSN-BS be the distance between a SN (selected to report 
sensor readings) and its BS, which on average is    /2. Then 
the average numbers of hops to forward data from a source SN 
to the BS, denoted by     
   , can be estimated as follows: 
          ,  
    
  
   
          (11)
The equation above equates the sum of hop distances with 
the source-destination distance.  
The success probability for SNj to transmit a packet to at 
least  p next-hop SN neighbors (with indices k=1, 2, … p) 
along the direction of the destination node based on 
geographical routing is given by: 
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where   , 
       ,   is the probability that SNk is compromised 
as derived in Equation 9, and ň       ,   is the number of 
forwarding neighbor SNs for SNj as derived from Equation 6.  
A path starting at SNj to the BS is successful if in each hop 
there is at least one healthy next-hop SN neighbor found. 
Thus, the success probability of a path starting from SNj (a 
source node has index j=1) to the BS is given by: 
  
        
   1 
    
     
   
  (13) 
For the 2
nd countermeasure, we create mp paths between a 
source SN and the BS for path redundancy. The mp paths are 
formed by choosing mp SNs in the first hop and then choosing 
only one SN in each of the subsequent hops. The source SN 
will fail to deliver data to the SN if one of the following 
happens: (a) none of the SNs in the first hop receives the 
message; (b) in the first hop, i (1≤ i<mp) SNs receive the 
message, and each of them attempts to form a path for data 
delivery; however, all i paths fail to deliver the message 
because the subsequent hops fail to receive the broadcast 
message; or (c) in the first hop, at least mp SNs receive the 
message from the source SN from which mp SNs are randomly 
selected to forward data, but all mp paths fail to deliver the 
message because the subsequent hops fail to receive the 
message.  Summarizing above, the probability of a source SN 
(with index j=1) failing to deliver data to the BS through 
multipath routing is given by:  
  
       1    
   1       
     
  
   
 1     
      (14)
Consequently, the failure probability of data delivery to the 
BS from ms source SNs, each utilizing mp paths to relay data, is 
given by: 
s m SN
c
SN
f t x Q Q Q ))] ), 1 ( ( 1 )( 1 ( 1 [ 1 , 1 − − − =   (15)
Therefore, the query success probability is given by: 
f q Q R − =1   (16)
Note that in the above derivation we omit time for brevity. 
More precisely,    derived above should be      ,   since the 
query success probability is a function of time, depending on 
the node count and population density at the i
th query’s 
execution time (i.e., at time   , ). 
C.  Energy Consumption 
Now we estimate the amounts of energy spent by a SN 
located at distance x away from the BS during a query interval 
[  , ,   ,   ] and an IDS interval [  , ,   ,   ] so as to estimate 
Nq, the maximum number of queries this SN can possible 
handle before running into energy exhaustion. When a SN at 
distance x consumes all its energy, a ‘black ring’ at distance x 
away from the BS is formed. Nodes at distance greater than x 
will have to increase radio range in order to maintain connectivity with the BS but eventually the system ceases to 
function. When selective capture is in effect, one can see that a 
black ring can more easily develop for nodes close to the BS.  
To normalize energy consumption over Nq queries, let α be 
the ratio of the IDS execution rate to the query arrival rate so 
that  αNq  is the numbers of IDS cycles before SN energy 
exhaustion. Then, we can estimate Nq by the fact that the SN 
energy consumed due to intrusion detection, and query 
processing is equal to the initial SN energy as follows: 
  
        
    ,  ,   
   
   
      
    ,  ,  
  
   
  (17) 
Below we outline how to calculate    
    ,  ,    and 
    
    ,  ,  .   We first estimate energy consumed by 
transmission and reception over wireless link. The energy spent 
by a SN to transmit an encrypted data packet of length nb bits 
over a distance r is estimated as [15]: 
  
                            (18) 
Here Eelec is the energy dissipated to run the transmitter and 
receiver circuitry, Eamp   is the energy used by the transmit 
amplifier, and r is the transmission radio range. We use the 
current SN radio range to derive   
  . We  set      = 10 
pJ/bit/m
2  and    2  when the radio range is less than a 
threshold distance    (75m) and     = 0.0013 pJ/bit/m
4  and 
  4    otherwise[15]. The energy spent by a node to receive an 
encrypted message of length nb bits is given by: 
  
              (19) 
The energy consumed by a SN located at x for processing 
the  i
th query,   
    ,  ,  ,  conditioning on it is being a data 
delivery path with probability    
    ,  ,   is the energy 
consumed for reception (except when it is a source SN) and 
transmission, i.e.,  
  
    ,  ,      
    ,  ,        
  
    
        ,  ,     
(20)   
Since source SNs are randomly picked to answer a query, 
the probability that a SN at distance x away from the BS is on 
the data path    
    ,  ,   is estimated as the probability of a 
SN at x is needed for data delivery, (        /     , multiplied 
with the probability that this particular sensor is needed, 
    /     ,  ,  .      ,  ,          ,    2     
       ,  ,  
       ,  ,    
is the total number of SNs within the radio range of SNs at 
distance x.  
For intrusion detection every node is evaluated by m voters 
in an IDS cycle, and each voter sends its vote to the other m - 1 
voters. Hence, the energy spent by a SN located at x in the i
th 
IDS cycle,     
    ,  ,  , conditioning on it serving as a voter 
with probability     
    ,  ,    for each of its 
     ,  ,   neighbors is the energy consumed for reception of 
m-1 votes and transmission of its vote to other m-1 voters, i.e.,  
    
    ,  ,        
    ,  ,         ,  ,  
     1     
    
         ,  ,     
(21)
Here the probability that a SN at distance x serves as a voter 
for a neighbor SN,    
    ,  ,  , is estimated as  /     ,  ,  . 
The system fails when a SN at distance        
    (SN 
maximum radio range) depletes its energy since there is no way 
to maintain connectivity even by dynamic range adjustment. 
That is, we set        
   to obtain      ,  , and        ,   from 
Equations 20, and 21, respectively, and then we calculate 
    from Equation 17. The knowledge of     along with 
     ,   in Equation 16 allows us to calculate the system MTTF 
given by Equation 2. 
IV.  ADAPTIVE NETWORK MANAGEMENT  FOR COUNTERING 
SELECTIVE CAPTURE 
The objective of our adaptive network management 
algorithm is to dynamically adjust the best radio range to 
maintain network connectivity, to apply the best redundancy 
level in terms of path redundancy (mp) and source redundancy 
(ms), and to apply the best intrusion detection settings in terms 
of the number of voters (m) and the intrusion invocation 
interval (    ) to counter selective capture so as to maximize 
the MTTF, in response to environment changes including SN 
node density and SN capture rate.  
All nodes in the system act periodically to a “   timer” 
event to adjust the optimal parameter setting in response to 
changing environments. The optimal design settings in terms of 
optimal     , ,   ,and     are determined at static design 
time and pre-stored in a table over perceivable ranges of input 
parameter values. The BS performs a table lookup operation 
with extrapolation techniques applied to determine the optimal 
design parameter settings. The action performed by a BS upon 
a       timer event includes (a) determining 
     , ,   ,and      based on runtime knowledge of node 
density and attacker strength; and (b) notifying SNs of the new 
     and   settings. The action performed by a SN upon this 
   timer event is to adjust its radio range to maintain SN 
connectivity. The action taken upon receiving the control 
packet from its BS is to update the new      and   settings for 
intrusion detection. When a        timer event happens, each 
node in the system uses it current      and    settings  to 
perform intrusion detection. When a data packet arrival event 
occurs, each SN simply follows the prescribed multipath 
routing protocol to route the packet. The complexity is O(1) for 
each SN because of the table lookup technique employed.  
When the BS receives a query from a user, it triggers 
multipath routing for intrusion tolerance using the current 
optimal     and     settings to prolong the system useful 
lifetime. The complexity is also O(1) for the BS. 
V.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we present numerical results. Our reference 
WSN consists of   
  = 1500 SN nodes initially deployed with 
density   
  and the BS sitting at the center of a circular area 
with radius     =300m.   The selective SN capture time is 
assumed to be exponentially distributed following the linear 
model described by Eq. 1, with    
    being once per 4 weeks 
and   
    (=1/     ) varying i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  o n c e  p e r  h a l f  
day  to  once  per  3  days. The radio range     is dynamically 
adjusted to maintain network connectivity of    = 7 to support 
basic multipath routing and voting-based IDS functions. The initial energy level of a SN is   
    2 Joule.  The  energy 
parameters used by the radio module are adopted from [6, 15]. 
The energy dissipation Eelec to run the transmitter and receiver 
circuitry is 50 nJ/bit. The energy used by the transmit amplifier 
to achieve an acceptable signal to noise ratio (    ) is 10 
pJ/bit/m
2  for transmitted distances less than the threshold 
distance    (75m) and 0.0013 pJ/bit/m
4 otherwise. The query 
arrival rate λq is a variable ranging from 10
-2 to 1 query/sec to 
reveal points of interest. The host IDS false positive probability 
and false negative probability (      and      ) vary between 1% 
and 5% to reflect the host intrusion detection strength as in [4]. 
Our objective is to identify the best protocol setting of our 
countermeasures against selective capture. This includes the 
radio range to be adjusted dynamically by individual SNs, the 
best redundancy level used for multipath routing, as well as 
the best redundancy level in terms of the number of voters and 
the best intrusion invocation interval used for intrusion 
detection to maximize the WSN lifetime in the presence of 
selective capture which turns critical nodes into malicious 
nodes capable of performing packet dropping attacks and bad-
mouthing attacks.  
We determine the optimal (mp, ms) setting (over the range 
of 1 to 5) under which the system MTTF is maximized 
through Equation 2. Tables I and II summarize the optimal 
(mp, ms) values to maximize the lifetime of the reference WSN 
under selective capture and random capture attacks, 
respectively, at m=3 (i.e., the number of voters is 3), with 
         1/  
     and        varying over a wide range of 
values. We first observe that there exists an optimal (mp, ms) 
setting under which the MTTF is maximized for either case. 
Furthermore, a higher (mp, ms) is needed when the attacker 
strength   
    increases. Also under selective capture attacks, 
the system must use a higher redundancy level to maximize 
the MTTF. For example when      = 4 hrs and      = 0.5 
days, the optimal (mp,  ms) setting is (2, 5) under selective 
capture (in Table 1) but is only (1, 5) under random capture 
attacks (in Table 2). This is because selective capture requires 
the system to apply more redundancy to cope with more 
critical nodes being compromised. The system is better off in 
this case to use higher redundancy to ensure secure routing at 
the expense of more energy consumption to maximize the 
system MTTF.  
 
TABLE I: Optimal (  ,   ) to counter Selective Capture with m=3 
and varying          /  
      and      
 
TABLE II: Optimal (  ,   ) to counter Random Capture with m=3 
and varying          /  
      and      
 
We next analyze the effect of the intrusion detection 
interval       (representing the intrusion detection strength) on 
the system MTTF. Whether to use a small or large      value 
depends on the attacker strength   
    . When the attacker 
strength is high (i.e., when          1 /    
     is small), as 
evidenced by the frequency at which bad nodes are detected 
by the IDS and evicted, we must counter it with high detection 
strength (a small      . Conversely, when the attacker strength 
is low, a large      could be used to save energy to maximize 
the MTTF. Figures 1 and 2 show the MTTF vs. (mp, ms) under 
small (    =1 hrs) and large (    =3 hrs) detection intervals, 
respectively, for the case when the attacker strength is high 
(      = 0.5 days). We again set m=3 to isolate its effect. We 
observe that at the optimal (mp, ms) setting, the MTTF under 
    =1 hrs (Figure 1) is much higher than the MTTF under 
    =3 hrs (Figure 2). This is because when the system is 
subject to a high capture rate, the system is better off to apply 
high detection strength (a small       at 1 hrs) at the expense 
of more energy consumption to quickly detect and evict 
compromised nodes, instead of applying low detection 
strength (a large      at 3 hrs), so as to increase the MTTF. 
This trend applies to both selective and random capture 
attacks. We also see that the MTTF under selective capture is 
much lower than that under random capture because with 
selective capture critical nodes are more easily compromised 
and back holes more easily formed near the BS to cause 
system failure.  
 
Figure 1: MTTF vs. (mp, ms) with High Detection Strength in the 
presence of High Attacker Strength. 
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Figure 2: MTTF vs. (mp, ms) with Low Detection Strength in the 
presence of High Attacker Strength. 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Countering Attacker Strength with      on the 
System MTTF under Random Capture vs. under Selective Capture. 
Figure 3 compares the effect of       on the MTTF under 
random capture vs. selective capture at the optimal (mp, ms) 
setting under random capture vs. selective capture. We again 
observe that there exists an optimal     value (marked by a 
black dot) at which the MTTF is maximized. Furthermore, the 
optimal     value under selective capture in general is smaller 
than that under random capture because the system has to 
increase detection strength to cope with selective capture 
which creates more compromised critical nodes.  
In Figure 4 we summarize the damaging effect of selective 
capture attacks compared with random capture attacks. It 
shows that selective capture has a devastating effect on the 
MTTF compared with random capture. The effect is especially 
pronounced when the attacker strength   
    is high (left end 
of the graph where         1/   
    is small). The MTTF at 
the optimal (mp, ms) setting under selective capture is relatively 
low compared with that under random capture because the 
success probability for a node to transmit a packet to at least p 
next-hop SN neighbors (Equation 11) is low as the node is 
close to the BS, as many critical nodes are compromised due 
to selective capture. The optimal (mp, ms) setting identified best 
balances the probability of query success probability 
(Equation 16) vs. energy consumption (Equation 17) to 
maximize the system MTTF. 
 
Figure 4: WSN lifetime under Random Capture vs. under Selective 
Capture with varying          
Figure 5 vividly displays how the “good SN density” 
     
     ,   evolves over time under selective capture vs. under 
random capture. It confirms that      
     ,   decreases over 
time because of capture, and the rate at which 
     
     ,   declines for SNs with x < 1/2 under selective 
capture is higher than that under random capture. The effect of 
selective capture on good node population is especially 
pronounced for critical nodes near the BS (i.e., when x=1/16 
or 1/8).  
Figure 6 displays how a SN at distance x dynamically 
adjusts its radio range to counter selective capture so as to 
maintain sufficient network connectivity and improve packet 
delivery reliability. It confirms that with the “dynamic radio 
range adjustment” countermeasure, a SN increases its radio 
range over time to maintain network connectivity. Further, 
under selective capture because critical nodes (i.e., when x is 
small) are more likely compromised, and subsequently 
detected and evicted from the system, a critical node must 
increase its radio range more rapidly to maintain network 
connectivity and improve packet delivery reliability to 
effectively counter selective capture. Figure 6 demonstrates 
that critical SNs (e.g., when x=1/16 or 1/8) are able to more 
rapidly adjust radio range to maximize the system MTTF. 
 
Figure 5: Density of Good SNs at Distance x vs. Time.  
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Figure 6: Adjusting Radio Range at Distance x vs. Time. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we proposed and analyzed adaptive network 
management with three countermeasures for coping with 
selective capture aiming to create holes near the base station in 
a wireless sensor network to block data delivery. Through 
numerical analysis, we demonstrated that our countermeasures 
are effective against selective capture. There exist best protocol 
settings in terms of the best radio adjustment, the best 
redundancy level for multipath routing, the best number of 
voters, and the best intrusion invocation interval used for 
intrusion detection to maximize the system lifetime. 
Leveraging the analysis techniques proposed in this paper, one 
can obtain optimal protocol settings at static time, store them in 
a table, and apply a simple table lookup operation at runtime to 
determine optimal settings for adaptive network management 
to maximize the system lifetime without runtime complexity. 
This paper considers three countermeasures against 
selective capture attacks. For future work, we plan to consider 
selective deployment, i.e., populating more critical nodes than 
edge nodes to effectively counter selective capture. We also 
plan to consider more sophisticated inside attacker behaviors 
including opportunistic, random and insidious behaviors [10] 
and investigate countermeasures against these attacker types. 
Finally, we also plan to investigate the use of trust/reputation 
management [5, 9, 11] augmented with fuzzy failure criteria 
[17, 18] to strengthen intrusion detection through “weighted 
voting,” leveraging knowledge of trust/reputation of neighbor 
nodes, as well as to tackle the “what paths to use” problem in 
multipath routing for intrusion tolerance in WSNs. This may 
involve the use of trust-based admission control strategies [19-
21] and location services [22-25] to increase the probability of 
path success probability for data delivery.  
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